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Abstract  
 Many studies about the effects of naturalization on earnings do not 
account for the endogenous characteristic of naturalization. This study is 
concerned with the determinants of naturalization, its effect on earnings, and 
reversal causality between earnings and naturalization. Ordinary least 
squares (OLS), treatment effect model, and simultaneous equation model are 
used to estimate the effect of naturalization on earnings for U.S. immigrants. 
Using a treatment effect model, we find that naturalization has a much higher 
positive impact than the OLS method on earnings, but by employing a 
simultaneous equation model, the naturalization premium becomes closer to 
that of OLS. Also, we find that correcting the simultaneity problem between 
earnings and naturalization is much more important than orthogonalizing the 
naturalization variable using instruments. 
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Introduction 
The United States has long been known as “a land of immigrants,” 
not only because its founding fathers were immigrants but also because there 
has been a continuous influx of immigrants. Since 1820, more than 70 
million immigrants have entered the United States. During the period of 
1995 to 2000 alone more than 7 million foreign-born individuals entered, 
which set a record high in the U.S. history. Thus, foreign-born individuals 
make up 11.1 percent of the total population, as of 2000. 
Immigration issues are complex. It has been both a crucial 
component of America’s growth and, particularly in recent years, one of the 
most contentious issues on the nation’s political agenda. For this reason, a 
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vast volume of studies have been performed to understand the role and 
impact of immigration on the economy and the society as well as to guide 
policy-makers, politicians and various groups of interest. 
Economic consequences of immigration, simply speaking, provide an 
ideal source of labor and increase productivity growth. In this regard, many 
empirical studies focused on how immigrants perform in the U.S. labor 
market and whether immigration hurts employment opportunities of native 
workers. For the former question, there is a consensus that immigrants work 
hard for low pay. Particularly, the pioneering work of Chiswick (1978) 
shows that immigrants earn about 17 percent less than comparable natives at 
the time of arrival, but immigrant earnings overtake native earning within 15 
years due to wage growth as immigrants assimilate to the host country. It has 
also been found that the specific wage gap between immigrants and native 
workers depends upon various factors: education, work experience, 
demographic characteristics, English proficiency as a proxy for degree of by 
assimilation, and so on. 
There are various source of higher wage growth in the process of 
immigrant’s assimilation. Higher wage growth can be ascribed to the 
characteristics of immigrants: ability and higher motivation (Chiswick 1978) 
or willingness to work longer and harder (Carliner 1980). It can also be 
ascribed to the accumulation of human capital as in economic growth 
literature. However, the result of higher wage growth may not be as robust as 
has been claimed. Borjas (1985) hypothesized that immigrants of 1970s may 
be intrinsically different from those of 1990s because of changes in 
immigration policy or changes in conditions in the source countries and the 
U.S. He then showed that there exist cohort effects, with more recent 
immigrant cohorts having relatively lower wage rates. Bratsberg et al. (2006) 
showed that higher wage growth and cohort effects are negligible for less 
educated immigrants. 
Lower wages of immigrants increases profits for firms and lowers 
prices for consumers, therefore spurring economic growth. Borjas (2001) 
estimated that immigration into the U.S. depressed wages by $152 billion 
annually, but increased profits by $160 billions. A half century ago, Thomas 
(1954) clarified underlying patterns showing that the inflow of immigrants, 
coupled with foreign capital inflows, helped push the American economy in 
its upswings and slowed the growth phase in the source countries. 
For the second question, Borjas (1994) found it unacceptable that the 
employment opportunities of native workers are strongly and adversely 
affected by immigration although immigration lowers native wages in the 
local labor markets. 
Despite economic consequences, there exists criticism of 
immigration. Some fear the threat to the status quo posed by immigrants with 
European Scientific Journal March  2015 edition vol.11, No.7 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
211 
different social values and cultures and by the higher birth rate of 
immigrants. Some also criticize the burden of public assistance programs for 
immigrants. One private organization suggests that illegal immigration costs 
the state of Florida $1.7 billion per year for education, medical care and 
incarceration (Martin and Hehlman 2005). The issue of immigration 
becomes more contentious as the values and cultures of recent immigrants 
diverge more from European and Christian origins and as fiscal burdens of 
governments increase. 
Immigrant naturalization or citizenship acquisition become more 
important as the criticism of immigration intensifies for the following 
reasons. First, immigrant naturalization helps reduces criticism about 
immigration because it signifies the immigrants’ allegiance and commitment 
to the host country. Second, citizenship acquisition provides an effective way 
to have political influence on immigration policy as well as on other public 
policies, such as education and medical care. As Yang (1994) noted, the 
benefits of naturalization are more opportunities in employment (e.g., some 
jobs in federal government agencies), welfare assistance (e.g., social security 
benefits), and education (e.g., loans and fellowships). Some costs are an 
increase in obligations (e.g., serving in the military if drafted), a reduction in 
rights in the source countries, and an actual cost in the long and complicated 
application process of naturalization. 
Given this benefit and cost of naturalization, some studies were 
devoted to find out what affects naturalization. Earlier studies emphasized 
the role of socioeconomic status and showed that immigrants with higher 
education and higher family income were more likely to obtain citizenship 
(Bernard 1936), whereas recent studies emphasized the role of assimilation 
(e.g., English competence) into the U.S. (Barken and Khokhlov 1980), 
country-of-origin characteristics (Woodrow-Lafield et al. 2004), personal 
ties (Street 2013), social context of immigrant reception (van Hook et al. 
2006), and immigration policy (Rallu 2011). However, the empirical 
evidence is mixed, suggesting that the decision of naturalization is much 
complicated. 
It is evident that the study on the performance of immigrants in the 
labor market must consider the values of naturalization when the criticism of 
immigration mounts, when naturalization is an effective way to counter the 
criticism, and when the decision of naturalization is affected by many 
factors, socioeconomic and non-socioeconomic. In this respect, the study of 
Bratsberg et al. (2002) is noteworthy: a higher wage growth occurs only after 
naturalization, although accumulation of human capital began before 
naturalization, because naturalization facilitates assimilation into the U.S. 
labor market. However, Bratsberg et al. (2002) did not consider endogenous 
characteristics of factors, such as period of immigration, county-of-origin 
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and English proficiency, that affect both the decision of naturalization and 
the wages of immigrants. Therefore, Bratsberg et al. (2002) may be subject 
to endogenous bias since the endogeneity of naturalization is not taken into 
account. 
In this paper, we consider endogeneity of naturalization to determine 
the wages of naturalized immigrants. For this, we first consider simple 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation without considering this endogeneity 
and then perform a test to see whether there exists an endogeneity problem, 
confirming its existence in the simple OLS estimation. So we consider 
alternative way to estimate wage equation to tackle the problem. Treatment 
effect and simultaneous equation models are used to show that naturalized 
immigrants earn more than non-naturalized immigrants. 
 
Model Specification and Data 
OLS Estimation 
Our basic interest can be described using a simple model: 
1111ln iiii xNY εβγ ++=      (1) 
where ln iY  is a log of annual earnings of individual i , iN  is an index 
variable for naturalization, 1ix  is a vector of control variables, 1iε  is the error 
term. If naturalization is purely exogenous, then OLS estimation is unbiased. 
However, if naturalization is endogenous, then coefficient estimate on 
naturalization is biased. 
 
Tests for Endogeneity 
To test for the endogeneity of the naturalization, we employ the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test. Suppose naturalization is correlated with 
error term in Equation (1), and assume that the naturalization is a function of 
family income (total family income minus interviewee’s total wages and 
salaries, and measured in thousand dollars) and other exogenous variables 
such as education, occupation, industry and country of origin such that 
222 iii xN εβ +=       (2) 
where 2ix  is a vector of instruments and 2iε  is the error term (for estimation 
purposes, we assume ),0(~ 22 σε Ni  for OLS, and )1,0(~2 Niε  for probit in 
Equation (2)). To test the null that iN  is uncorrelated with 1iε  in Equation 
(1), first get estimated residuals of Equation (2) and defined as naturalization 
index (N) minus estimated probability of being a naturalized, 2iε
 , then 
perform an augmented regression of Equation (1): 
13122ln iiiii uxNY +++= βπεγ
     (3) 
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The only difference between Equations (1) and (3) is that we add 
residuals from the probit instrumental variable (IV) Equation to (1). If the 
coefficient estimate on the residual πˆ  is significantly different from zero, 
then the null hypothesis that the OLS estimator is uncorrelated with error 
term will be rejected, hence OLS is not consistent. 
 
Treatment Effect Model 
There is a possibility that earnings may affect the naturalization 
decision. We, therefore, consider the following treatment effect model (See 
Maddala (1983) for more details.). Let 
1111
**ln iiii xNY εβγ ++=      (4) 
222
*
iii xN εβ +=       (5) 
where ln *iY  is the log of earnings, 
*
iN  is the naturalization status, 1ix  and 2ix  
are vectors of exogenous variables, ),0(~ 21 σε Ni , )1,0(~2 Niε  and 
ρεε =),( 21 iiCorr . 
*ln iY  and 
*
iN  are assumed to be observed as 
*ln ii YY =  1=iN   if 0* >iN  and 0=iN   otherwis 
thus making naturalization exogenous by using instruments. The instruments 
for naturalization are family income, annual amount of return to house 
equity, and some of the explanatory variables used in the earnings equation. 
 
Simultaneous Equation Model 
There is a possibility that there is a simultaneity problem between 
earnings and naturalization. Therefore, we consider the following 
simultaneous equation model. Let 
1111
**ln iiii xNY εβγ ++=      (6) 
2222
** ln iiii xYN εβγ ++=      (7) 
All the specifications in the simultaneous equation are the same as in 
the treatment effect model, except that we explicitly consider the earnings 
effect in the naturalization probit equation. 
The procedure of obtaining robust standard errors is exactly the same 
as in Heckman (1978), except that we add the log of earnings into Equation 
(7). The procedures are as follow: First, from the structural equations of 
Equation (6) and (7), we derive reduced form of the earnings and the 
naturalization equations. Then, for earnings equation, we run OLS and get 
constructed earnings, and for the naturalization equation, we run a probit and 
get a constructed naturalization. After obtaining the constructed earnings and 
naturalization, we use these instead of endogenous variables on the right 
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hand side of Equations (6) and (7). Finally, using a suitable procedure, we 
derive robust standard errors (See Maddala (1983) for more details.). 
 
Data 
The data are primarily taken from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) March Supplement for 1994-2002. Our research is confined to those 
periods because the CPS started collecting information on citizenship after 
1994, and no data on race is available. Countries’ native, official and 
common languages are from the World Factbook. By matching the country 
of birth, father’s country of birth, and mother’s country of birth with 
language, we are able to construct the language dummies that equal 1 if 
English is at least commonly used in the country of birth. Our data are 
limited to the full-time male worker whose age is between 18 and 65, and 
this consists of 31,482 total observations. 
Our focus is on the effect of naturalization on earnings among 
immigrants, so we exclude the observations of U.S. native citizens. We use 
age as a proxy for experience. We could construct ‘the potential experience’ 
as suggested by Mincer (1974) to account for work experience premium. He 
defined ‘potential experience’ as ‘age − years of schooling − 6’ and 
educational attainment is categorical in the CPS. So, if we take the mean 
values of each category, we confront two problems. First, potential 
experience can have a negative value. Second, unlike the U.S., other 
countries may have different years of schooling system. Therefore, we use 
age as a proxy for experience. As Chiswick (1978) points out, ignoring the 
number of years since migration would mask important differences among 
foreign born immigrants. Therefore, we include ‘years since migration 
(YSM) to US,’ and it is defined as ‘survey year – year of entry.’ The years of 
entry is also categorical in the CPS, so we take the mean of each category 
and subtract from the interview year. Since we use observation for the age in 
between 18 and 65, for the category of ‘before 1950’, we calculate YSM as 
‘interview year – [(interview year-65)-1949]/2.’ Also, by law, foreigners 
should stay, in general, in the United State at least five years. Therefore, 
observations with less than 5 years of entry to United States are excluded. 
For odd (even) year, observations with less than 6 (5) years of entry to U.S. 
are excluded. This is due to the limitation of CPS dataset. 
Annual earnings with less than $1,000 are excluded from our 
research. We also exclude three top-coded observations in earnings. 
Regarding the annual amount of returns to house equity, we exclude bottom-
coded observations (-9999). Family income is defined as (total family 
income – wages and salaries). Amount of returns to house equity and family 
income are measured in thousand dollars. Finally, we exclude countries if 
their sample size is less than 5 for each country. Deleted countries and their 
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sample size are Finland (3), Northern Island (3), Lithuania (4) and Bermuda 
(2). 
Since many of the variables are in discrete forms in the CPS 
questionnaires, we regroup categories. We reduce marriage categories into 3 
(married, separated/divorced, never married), education categories into 4 
(less than high school, high school, junior college degree [including 
observations with college but no degree], college degree or above), and race 
categories into 3 (white, black, others). 
We categorize industries into 12 groups, occupations into 13 groups, 
and classes of jobs into 3 groups. The definition and categorization of 
industries, occupations and class of jobs are illustrated in Table 1 and in 
Figure 1. 
Table 1. Means and Definitions of Variables 
Variable All Group Non-naturalized Naturalized 
Earnings 29814.96 24861.72 38258.46 
Log of Earnings 10.0317 9.8636 10.3183 
Family income (000's) 2.7934 1.9051 4.3077 
Return to House Equity (000's) 2.3307 1.6938 3.4164 
Years Since Migration (YSM) 17.9751 14.8310 23.3347 
Age 38.7285 36.5274 42.4807 
Inequality 0.0522 0.0490 0.0577 
Naturalization dummies 0.3697   
Race dummies    
White 0.7441 0.7998 0.6492 
Black 0.0629 0.0567 0.0735 
Other (omitted) 0.1930 0.1435 0.2773 
Education dummies    
Less than high school 0.3771 0.4817 0.1988 
High school degree (omitted) 0.2463 0.2442 0.2499 
Junior College 0.1598 0.1286 0.2131 
College and over 0.2168 0.1455 0.3381 
Marital status Dummies    
Married 0.7155 0.6846 0.7680 
Separated/divorced 0.0733 0.0673 0.0835 
Never married 0.2112 0.2481 0.1485 
English fluency dummies    
English 0.1661 0.1273 0.2323 
Official or common language    
English (Father) 0.1581 0.1218 0.2200 
English (Mother) 0.1586 0.1222 0.2208 
Industry dummies    
Ag./Forestry/Fisheries (omitted) 0.0586 0.0777 0.0261 
Mining 0.0037 0.0034 0.0044 
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Construction 0.1198 0.1408 0.0842 
Manufacturing 0.2355 0.2382 0.2309 
Transport/Comm./Utility 0.0745 0.0605 0.0983 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 0.2137 0.2265 0.1919 
Finance/Ins./Real Estate 0.0396 0.0315 0.0534 
Personal Services 0.0387 0.0401 0.0364 
Business/Repair Services 0.0840 0.0906 0.0726 
Entertainment/Rec. Services 0.0150 0.0140 0.0166 
Professional Services 0.0989 0.0702 0.1479 
Public Administration 0.0179 0.0067 0.0372 
Occupation dummies    
Executive, Admin. & Managerial (omitted) 0.0919 0.0629 0.1412 
Professional Specialty 0.0978 0.0652 0.1533 
Technicians/Related Support 0.0218 0.0143 0.0346 
Sales Occupations 0.0677 0.0547 0.0898 
Admin. Support, Incl. Clerical 0.0482 0.0402 0.0618 
Private Household Occ. 0.0009 0.0010 0.0008 
Protective Service Occ. 0.0116 0.0082 0.0174 
Service, Excl. Protective Hhld. 0.1367 0.1568 0.1023 
Precision Prod., Craft & Repair 0.1985 0.2106 0.1779 
Machine Opers, Assmblers & Inspectors 0.1146 0.1326 0.0838 
Transportation and Meterial Moving 0.0688 0.0735 0.0607 
Handlers, Equip. Cleaners, Helpers, Laborers 0.0795 0.0981 0.0478 
Farming, Forestry and Fishing 0.0621 0.0817 0.0286 
Class of Job dummies    
Government 0.0622 0.0323 0.1132 
Private wage and salary sector 0.8866 0.9355 0.8031 
Self-employed (omitted) 0.0512 0.0322 0.0837 
Year dummies    
Year – 1994 (omitted) 0.0843 0.0900 0.0747 
Year - 1995 0.0945 0.0981 0.0883 
Year - 1996 0.0965 0.1034 0.0849 
Year - 1997 0.1011 0.1000 0.1029 
Year - 1998 0.1080 0.1042 0.1144 
Year - 1999 0.1056 0.1042 0.1082 
Year - 2000 0.1204 0.1221 0.1176 
Year - 2001 0.1159 0.1127 0.1212 
Year - 2002 0.1736 0.1652 0.1878 
Observation 31,482 19,842 11,640 
 
Finally and most interestingly, we employ a measure of inequality to 
investigate the effect of inequality on naturalization. We define inequality as 
‘standard deviation of log of earnings for people with the same educations, in 
the same industries, and with the same occupations.’ We delete observations 
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with zero inequality. In our sample, zero inequality means that sample size 
within a cell is less than one in the relevant cells. A person may easily 
compare his earnings with the earnings of his colleagues’ earnings with the 
same educational background in the same position within the same company. 
Therefore, our measure of inequality may be a good instrument for 
naturalization decision. 
Figure 1. Average Earnings and Family Income by Naturalization Status 
  
  
 
Figure 2. Distributions of Variables by Naturalization Status 
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Empirical Results 
OLS Estimation Results 
The OLS estimation results are shown in Table 2 and Table 3. Table 
2 presents the estimation results without interaction terms. There are some 
differences in the coefficient estimate of naturalization, depending on the 
specification of the model, but all show positive and significant effects on 
earnings. The coefficient estimate is the greatest (0.130) in column 1, and the 
smallest (0.081) in column 4 of Table 2. As Chiswick (1978) points out, the 
YSM variable is very important and correlated with naturalization. By 
including YSM, the coefficient estimate of naturalization drops significantly. 
In column 3, we include an English dummy and find that, if he is from a 
country where English is either an official or commonly used language, there 
is a 0.8 percent earnings premium. Finally, in column 4, we include country 
dummies, and the naturalization premium is 8.1 percent, which is the 
smallest premium among four different specifications. 
Table 2. OLS Results for Earnings Equation 
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable: Log of Earnings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Naturalization 0.130*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.081*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
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Age Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (2.78e-5) (2.77e-5) (2.77e-5) (2.76e-5) 
Education (High School Degree omitted)     
     
Less than High School -0.190*** -0.188*** -0.187*** -0.157*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Junior College 0.065*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
College Degree and Over 0.239*** 0.255*** 0.254*** 0.238*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) 
Marital Status (Separate/Divorced 
omitted)     
     
Married 0.122*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.135*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Never Married -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.052*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Race (Omitted: other than white or black)     
     
White 0.026*** -0.003 -4.40E-04 -0.027 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) 
Black -0.082*** -0.086*** -0.085*** -0.066** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.027) 
English (Father) 0.081** 0.084** 0.038 0.050 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) 
English (Mother) 0.022 0.020 -0.035 -0.033 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) 
English   0.105***  
   (0.028)  
Year Since Migration (YSM)  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
  (4.41e-4) (4.41e-4) (4.58e-4) 
Constant 8.731*** 8.727*** 8.724*** 8.924*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.127) 
Fixed Effects     
Industry YES YES YES YES 
Occupation YES YES YES YES 
Class of Job YES YES YES YES 
Year YES YES YES YES 
Country NO NO NO YES 
R2 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.40 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
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The results in Table 3 are the extension of the specification in column 
4 of Table 2, except we include the interaction terms. By including 
interaction terms, we find that the naturalization premium varies depending 
on situations. The coefficient estimate on naturalization is statistically 
insignificant at the conventional levels. For those who have less than a high 
school degree, becoming a citizen lowers the earnings by 3.7 percent. The 
citizenship premium is more apparent in occupational categories. If he has a 
sales occupation, being a citizen raises earnings by 7.8 percent, and if he has 
a private household occupation, being a citizen raises earnings by 58.5 
percent. In sum, Table 3 shows that the naturalization premium exists in 
different occupations. 
Table 3. OLS Results for Earnings Equation with Interaction Terms 
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable: Log of Earnings 
 Level Interaction Terms with Naturalization 
Naturalization 0.035  
 (0.140)  
Age 0.057*** -4.47E-04 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
Age Squared -0.001*** 4.46E-05 
 (3.62e-5) (5.98E-05) 
Education (High School Degree omitted)   
   
Less than High School -0.147*** -0.037* 
 (0.011) (0.020) 
Junior College 0.048*** 0.017 
 (0.015) (0.022) 
College Degree and Over 0.239*** -0.003 
 (0.018) (0.025) 
Marital Status (Separate/Divorced omitted)   
   
Married 0.121*** 0.031 
 (0.017) (0.027) 
Never Married -0.045** -0.038 
 (0.019) (0.032) 
Race (Omitted: other than white or black)   
   
White -0.023 -0.012 
 (0.019) (0.020) 
Black -0.065** -0.006 
 (0.030) (0.032) 
English (Father) 0.073 -0.045 
 (0.053) (0.071) 
English (Mother) -0.008 -0.051 
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 (0.053) (0.071) 
Year Since Migration (YSM) 0.007*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Industry (Ag./Forestry/Fisheries omitted)   
   
Mining 0.405*** -0.079 
 (0.081) (0.134) 
Construction 0.088** 0.020 
 (0.038) (0.079) 
Manufacturing 0.179*** 0.008 
 (0.037) (0.077) 
Transport/Comm./Utility 0.231*** -0.007 
 (0.040) (0.079) 
Wholesale/Retail Trade 0.034 -0.025 
 (0.036) (0.077) 
Finance/Ins./Real Estate 0.164*** -0.005 
 (0.042) (0.082) 
Personal Services 0.069* -0.010 
 (0.040) (0.083) 
Business/Repair Services 0.039 -0.015 
 (0.038) (0.079) 
Entertainment/Rec. Services -0.044 0.089 
 (0.047) (0.087) 
Professional Services 0.020 0.069 
 (0.040) (0.079) 
Public Administration 0.048 0.099 
 (0.069) (0.103) 
Occupation (Executive, Admin. & Managerial omitted)  
   
Professional Specialty 0.048* 0.015 
 (0.026) (0.034) 
Technicians/Related Support -0.138*** 0.077 
 (0.040) (0.052) 
Sales Occupations -0.275*** 0.078** 
 (0.026) (0.036) 
Admin. Support, Incl. Clerical -0.390*** 0.045 
 (0.028) (0.040) 
Private Household Occ. -1.165*** 0.585** 
 (0.136) (0.243) 
Protective Service Occ. -0.593*** 0.389*** 
 (0.051) (0.070) 
Service, Excl. Protective Hhld. -0.541*** 0.004 
 (0.022) (0.034) 
Precision Prod., Craft & Repair -0.364*** 0.087*** 
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 (0.022) (0.031) 
Machine Opers, Assmblers & Inspectors -0.501*** 0.071* 
 (0.024) (0.037) 
Transportation and Meterial Moving -0.408*** -0.004 
 (0.025) (0.039) 
Handlers, Equip. Cleaners, Helpers, Laborers -0.546*** 0.004 
 (0.024) (0.040) 
Farming, Forestry and Fishing -0.597*** 0.087 
 (0.039) (0.077) 
Class of Job (Self-employed omitted)   
   
Government Sector 0.089** -0.050 
 (0.038) (0.048) 
Private wage and salary sector 0.041* -0.021 
 (0.025) (0.033) 
Year Fixed Effects / Country Fixed Effects YES/YES 
R2 0.40 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
Tests for Endogeneity 
To test for endogeneity using Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test 
suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), we need to first estimate IV 
equation. 
Let’s consider the following three equations. To test for endogeneity, 
first we obtain residuals of Equation (9) from either a regression or a probit 
of naturalization on other explanatory variables and then add the estimated 
residual to Equation (8). An F-test on 2iˆε  in Equation (10) determines the 
validity of the null that naturalization is not correlated with error term in 
Equation (8). The specification of Equation (8) corresponds to the second 
column of Table 2. Also instruments for naturalization equation [Equation 
(9)] are the family income, the annual amount of return to house equity, a 
measure of inequality, year since migration, educational dummies, marital 
status dummies, race dummies, industry dummies, occupation dummies and 
country dummies. 
* *
1 1 1 1ln i i i iY N xγ β ε= + +      (8) 
*
2 2 2i i iN x β ε= +       (9) 
* *
2 3 1 3 3ˆln i i i iY N x uε π γ β= + + +     (10) 
First we use linear probability model on Equation (9) and test for 
endogeneity. The F-statistic on 2iˆε  is 30.71 and significant at one percent 
significance level. Using a probit model on Equation (9) produces a similar 
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result: the F-statistic on 2iˆε  is 44.50 and also statistically significant at one 
percent significance level. Therefore, a null hypothesis that naturalization is 
not correlated with error term is rejected. 
 
Treatment Effect Model Estimation Results 
The treatment effect estimation results are summarized in Table 4. 
The first column in Table 4 shows the estimation results using instruments. 
The coefficient estimate on constructed naturalization is 0.272, which is 
much higher compared with that from OLS. 
Table 4. Treatment Effect Model 
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable 
 Earnings Naturalization 
  Estimation Results Marginal Effect 
Constructed Naturalization 0.272***   
 (0.033)   
Family Income  0.002** 0.001 
  (0.001)  
Return to House Equity  0.023*** 0.007 
  (0.002)  
Inequality  -0.429** -0.081 
  (0.186)  
Year Since Migration (YSM) 0.004*** 0.059*** 0.022 
 (0.001) (0.001)  
Age 0.055*** -4.88E-04 -1.30E-05 
 (0.002) (0.001)  
Age Squared -0.001***   
 (2.95e-5)   
Education (High School Degree omitted)    
    
Less than High School -0.165*** -0.307*** -0.113 
 (0.010) (0.023)  
Junior College 0.049*** 0.107*** 0.039 
 (0.011) (0.026)  
College Degree and Over 0.238*** 0.196*** 0.077 
 (0.014) (0.029)  
Marital Status (Separate/Divorced omitted)    
    
Married 0.124*** 0.044 0.017 
 (0.014) (0.033)  
Never Married -0.051*** -0.142*** -0.049 
 (0.016) (0.038)  
Race (Omitted: other than white or black)    
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White 0.025** -0.169*** -0.056 
 (0.011) (0.042)  
Black -0.073*** -0.043 -0.015 
 (0.017) (0.063)  
English (Father) 0.084**   
 (0.041)   
English (Mother) 0.023   
 (0.041)   
Constant 8.675*** -0.834***  
 (0.068) (0.287)  
Fixed Effects    
Industry YES YES  
Occupation YES YES  
Class of Job YES YES  
Year YES NO  
Country NO YES  
ρ -0.1940   
σ 0.6027   
λ -0.1169   
Wald Test of Independent Equations (ρ=0) χ2 (1) = 36.84 Probability > χ2 = 0.000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
The second column and the third column in Table 4 show the 
estimation results and marginal effects for treatment equation of 
naturalization. We use family income, annual amount of return to house 
equity, and inequality as instruments, in addition to some variables used in 
earnings equation. We find that family income and return to house equity has 
positive effect on naturalization. A $10,000 increase in family income raises 
the probability of naturalization by one percent, and a $10,000 increase in 
annual amount of return to house equity increase the probability of 
naturalization by 7 percent. 
One might expect that, if there is a higher inequality within the same 
education level in the same industry with the same occupation, he will be 
more likely to try to become a citizen. The result shown in Table 4 is quite 
opposite: a 10 percent increase in inequality decreases the probability of 
naturalization by 0.8 percent. One possible explanation to this is that 
naturalization is not determined solely by applicants’ will: U.S. government 
may ask for a certain applicant requirement, such as English fluency. Also, if 
the inequality is higher in a lower education level, less human capital-
intensive occupation, and less skill-intensive industry, then the negative 
effect of inequality on naturalization might be due to the requirements for 
naturalization by the U.S. government. 
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Simultaneous Equation Estimation Results 
Table 5 presents the simultaneous equation estimation results. The 
first column shows estimates of the earnings equation. Here, the coefficient 
estimate on constructed naturalization is 0.084, which happens to be very 
similar to the result from OLS. Compared with the treatment effect model, 
the coefficient estimate on constructed naturalization in the simultaneous 
equation model is much lower. It suggests that naturalization is not only 
correlated with the error term in OLS, but there is also a reverse causality 
between naturalization and earnings. 
Table 5. Simultaneous Equation Model 
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable 
 Earnings Naturalization 
  Estimates Marginal Effects 
Constructed Naturalization 0.084***   
 (0.012)   
Constructed Log of Earnings  0.374*** 0.137 
  (0.061)  
Family Income  0.002** 0.001 
  (0.001)  
Return to House Equity  0.012*** 0.004 
  (0.002)  
Inequality  0.055 0.020 
  (0.189)  
Year Since Migration (YSM) 0.004*** 0.057*** 0.021 
 (0.001) (0.001)  
Age 0.054*** -0.001 3.47E-04 
 (0.002) (0.001)  
Age Squared -0.001***   
 (2.79e-5)   
Education (High School Degree omitted)    
    
Less than High School -0.162*** -0.249*** -0.090 
 (0.010) (0.026)  
Junior College 0.050*** 0.080*** 0.030 
 (0.011) (0.027)  
College Degree and Over 0.240*** 0.110*** 0.041 
 (0.013) (0.034)  
Marital Status (Separate/Divorced omitted)    
    
Married 0.124*** 0.002 5.75E-04 
 (0.013) (0.033)  
Never Married -0.048*** -0.087** -0.031 
 (0.016) (0.038)  
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Race (Omitted: other than white or black)    
    
White 0.025** -0.148*** -0.055 
 (0.011) (0.042)  
Black -0.073*** -0.039 -0.140 
 (0.016) (0.065)  
English (Father) 0.083**   
 (0.036)   
English (Mother) 0.026   
 -0.036   
Constant 8.832*** -4.690***  
 (0.064) (0.693)  
Fixed Effects    
Industry YES YES  
Occupation YES YES  
Class of Job YES YES  
Year YES NO  
Country NO YES  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
The second and third columns in Table 5 show the estimates and 
marginal effects of the naturalization equation. Interestingly, in a 
simultaneous equation model, the coefficient estimate on inequality becomes 
insignificant. The only difference between the treatment effect model and the 
simultaneous equation model in the naturalization equation is that we include 
constructed earnings in the simultaneous equation. We, therefore, see that the 
inequality is negatively correlated with earnings. Therefore, one possible 
explanation on the negative effect of inequality on naturalization is more 
persuasive: a person with higher earnings can more easily become a citizen if 
he wants to, whereas a person with lower earnings may not, due to some 
requirements from U.S. government, hence inequality persists. A one percent 
increase in earnings increases the probability of naturalization by 13.7 
percent. We also find that an additional year after immigration increases the 
probability of naturalization by 2 percent. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between naturalization and 
earnings. Using OLS without interaction terms, we find that there exists a 
naturalization premium ranging from 0.081 to 0.130. By including 
interaction terms, we find that the naturalization premium itself does not 
exist, and it varies depending on situations. The citizenship premium is more 
apparent in certain occupation categories. If he has a sales occupation, being 
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a citizen raises earnings by 7.8 percent, and if he has a private household 
occupation, being a citizen raises earnings by 58.5 percent. In sum, our 
findings show that the naturalization premium exists in different occupations. 
Using the treatment effect model, we find that the coefficient 
estimate on constructed naturalization is 0.272, which is much higher 
compared with that from OLS. Using family income, the annual amount of 
return to house equity, and inequality as instruments, in addition to some 
variables used in earnings equation, we find that family income and return to 
house equity has a positive effect on naturalization. A $10,000 increase in 
family income raises the probability of naturalization by one percent and a 
$10,000 increase in annual amount of return to house equity increase the 
probability of naturalization by 7 percent. 
Compared with the treatment effect model, the coefficient estimate 
on constructed naturalization in the simultaneous equation model is much 
lower. It suggests that naturalization is not only correlated with the error 
term in OLS, but there is also a reverse causality between naturalization and 
earnings. Interestingly, in the simultaneous equation model, the coefficient 
estimate on inequality becomes insignificant. The only difference between 
the treatment effect model and the simultaneous equation model in our 
naturalization equation is that we include constructed earnings in 
simultaneous equation. We see that inequality is negatively correlated with 
earnings. Therefore, our one possible explanation of the negative effect of 
inequality on naturalization is more persuasive: a person with higher 
earnings can more easily become a citizen if he wants to, but a person with 
lower earnings may not easily become a citizen because of some 
requirements from the U.S. government, hence inequality persists. 
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